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ABSTRACT: Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument 
against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the 
Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensory 
experience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same 
kind of global skeptical scenario that Cartesians recognize as challenging the legitimacy 
of perceptual beliefs about the external world also undermine the reliability of a priori 
rationality. In reply, Pust contends that some a priori propositions are beyond doubt and 
that fact can be used to support the overall reliability of reason. This paper challenges 
Pust’s argument. I argue that while Pust successfully undermines a radical skeptical view 
of reason, he does not refute a more modest skepticism. I conclude with some 
suggestions for Cartesian a priorists. 
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Joel Pust has recently argued for the reliability of a priori intuition against an 
argument that attempts to show that reason is to be trusted no more than sensory 
experience.1 The anti-rationalist argument goes wrong, Pust thinks, by attempting 
to undermine the reliability of reason by thinking of the deliverances of reason 
under a description (e.g. as beliefs produced by reason) rather than thinking of 
them directly (e.g. 2+2=4). While I think Pust succeeds in showing that the 
skeptical argument against the a priori is insufficient to induce doubt in all a priori 
propositions, his defense of the reliability of reason only succeeds for a small, 
privileged class of a priori propositions. Therefore, while Pust successfully 
undermines a radical skeptical view of reason, he does not refute a more modest 
skeptical view. 
Descartes’ familiar Dream Argument against the reliability of sensory 
experience goes something like this. If I were asleep, I could have just the same 
sensations as I would have if I were awake. But if the same sensations could occur 
whether I was asleep or awake, then I have no way of telling whether or not my 
sensations are veridical. If I can’t tell whether my sensations are veridical or not, 
                                                                
1 Joel Pust, "Skepticism, Reason, and Reidianism," in The a Priori in Philosophy, eds. Albert 
Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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then I cannot know anything about the external world on the basis of those 
sensations. Therefore, I cannot know anything about the external world on the 
basis of sensation.   
A key assumption of the argument is that one could be radically deceived 
such that when one forms a belief on the basis of a kind of experience, that belief 
could be false while one is unable to tell ‘from the inside.’ In the Dream 
Argument, the radical deception possibility is that one might be dreaming. In 
Descartes’ later, more severe Evil Demon argument, the radical deception 
possibility is that one might be subject to the machinations of a very powerful 
deceiver whose goal is to thwart one’s attempts to arrive at true beliefs, whether 
by the senses or through the exercise of reason.   
The kind of skeptical argument motivated by contemporary Reidians – 
Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann – 
makes use of the skeptical concern that appears in the Evil Demon argument.2 The 
meditator/Descartes wonders whether it is possible for a deceiver to cause massive 
confusion that obscures the truth of even very simple claims of reason. If we can 
imagine seeming to correctly perform simple inferences while unbeknownst to us 
some deceiver is at work causing us to falsely believe our inferences are good, then 
we have reason to doubt the reliability of our faculty of reason. Due to the 
possibility of sensory deception, Cartesians treat reason as foundational, but not 
sensation. But Reidians are puzzled: if just the same type of skeptical worry—
namely, the possibility of global deception – suffices to undermine the reliability 
of sensory experience, it should also undermine the reliability of reason. Reidians 
thus accuse Cartesians of unjustifiably privileging reason over perception. 
Pust argues that, contrary to appearances, the cases are not alike.3 Here is 
his key move.  Pust argues that when we entertain doubts about the reliability of 
reason, we are thinking of the deliverances of reason indirectly rather than 
directly. Skeptical concerns raised indirectly do not actually concern the probable 
truth of claims of reason considered directly.4 
An example can illustrate this claim. I can entertain the proposition red is a 
color in multiple ways. To entertain the proposition directly is just to think red is 
                                                                
2 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968); Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1988); William Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and 
Rationality, eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983); Michael Bergmann, Justification without Awareness (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
3 Pust, “Skepticism,” 214. 
4 Pust, “Skepticism,” 217. 
Cartesianism, Neo-Reidianism, and the A Priori 
233 
a color. Suppose a moment after thinking red is a color directly, I am briefly 
distracted. Now I can think of that same proposition under a different description: 
the proposition I was thinking about before I got distracted.  The latter thought is 
an indirect way of entertaining the proposition red is a color.   
Pust puts the direct/indirect distinction to work as follows. When we 
wonder whether the class of propositions justifiable a priori might be subject to 
massive skeptical error, we are thinking of them under a description that picks out 
the propositions by way of the group in which they are members. When thought 
of in that way, putatively a priori propositions are thought of indirectly. That way 
of thinking is in contrast to thinking of a priori propositions directly: e.g. thinking 
to oneself 2+2=4, or whatever thinks exists, or nothing is both entirely green and 
entirely red, etc. Pust argues that skeptical concerns raised against the a priori 
indirectly are bogus: I am not really considering whether I might be mistaken 
about simple a priori propositions if I ask myself whether I can imagine being 
mistaken about whatever it is that I might call ‘a priori.’ Rather, I need to consider 
a priori propositions directly.5 But when I directly consider a proposition like 
2+2=4, the clear grasp I have of its truth renders idle any skeptical challenge aimed 
at undermining the faculty responsible for my clear grasp of the proposition. 
While Pust avoids overtly Cartesian terminology, let us call ‘clear and 
distinct’ a proposition the truth of which is guaranteed to one while one is 
considering the proposition directly.6 Pust’s argument is basically that the 
existence of clear and distinct propositions refutes any attempt to argue indirectly 
against the general reliability of reason.  
Granting Pust’s premises, there is still a serious skeptical concern with the a 
priori: the fact that some propositions are clear and distinct provides no reason to 
think the deliverances of reason are generally likely to be true. To defend the 
general reliability of reason would require an argument showing that the source of 
clarity and distinctness is reliable because it produces clarity and distinctness in 
just some cases. But the fact that clear and distinct propositions are individually 
guaranteed to be true does little to support the overall reliability of the faculty that 
provides a clear and distinct grasp of those propositions when the propositions in 
question are not themselves clear and distinct.   
                                                                
5 Pust, “Skepticism,” 217. 
6 Throughout I write of clear and distinct propositions. That is shorthand for ‘clear and distinct 
perception of the truth of a proposition.’ I trust that the substitution does not create confusion. I 
also ignore the possibility of holding that clear and distinct propositions are highly likely to be 
true though not so likely as to be guaranteed. Such a lesser epistemic status for clear and distinct 
propositions is compatible with what I say throughout. 
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According to the Cartesian view that interests us, the only feature that 
guarantees the truth of some a priori propositions is their clarity and distinctness. 
A defender of the a priori might attempt to defend the general reliability of reason 
by identifying some other property – perhaps being a belief produced by reason – 
as the one that makes a priori beliefs likely to be true. The argument needed here 
would establish the reliability of reason directly. But how? It is surely not clear 
and distinct that beliefs produced by reason are likely to be true. Even Descartes 
did not pursue that line of argument. (Notably, it was at just this point in the 
Meditations that he called in God to secure the general reliability of reason.) It is 
at least unclear how a direct argument for the general reliability of reason would 
go. (I think it’s hopeless.) In any case, that is not Pust’s argument. 
The indirect skeptical worry reappears with respect to the class of a priori 
propositions that are not clear and distinct: surely we can imagine that although 
some a priori propositions are true, many or most a priori propositions are false. 
One cannot acquire in Pust’s way any reason for thinking that other propositions 
which are given to one by reason are likely to be true on account of their etiology 
when those propositions are not clear and distinct upon direct examination. That 
problem is all that moderate skeptics about the a priori, including the Reidians, 
need to defend their skepticism against Pust. 
Even in the face of this moderate skepticism, though, Pust and Cartesians 
can continue to claim that reason is better suited to play a foundational role than 
sensory experience. Reason offers propositions whose excellent epistemic 
credentials are transparent. Sensory experience does not.  While the same sort of 
argument that undermines the reliability of sensory experience also challenges the 
reliability of reason, reason offers a safe haven in the form of clear and distinct 
propositions. A priori propositions capable of serving as foundations for 
knowledge, then, are not just whatever propositions are the product of reason, but 
propositions that are clear and distinct upon direct consideration.  
As a result, Cartesians do not need to argue for the general reliability of the 
a priori. The only reliability claim about the a priori Cartesians have to defend is 
that clear and distinct propositions are guaranteed to be true. The same 
considerations Pust uses to undermine indirect a priori skepticism also show that 
one need not attempt a general (indirect!) defense of reason. It is enough to rely 
upon propositions that are clear and distinct.   
A skeptical concern arises: relying exclusively on clear and distinct 
foundations cannot sustain what we ordinarily think is the extent of our a priori 
knowledge. I have two replies. First, the epistemologist’s primary task is to 
discover the epistemic standards we hold. If our deepest epistemic standards 
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suggest that we have less knowledge than we ordinarily think, then so be it.7  
Second, one might argue that less alleged knowledge is threatened than first 
appears. One might extend the privileged class of propositions that are now 
considered clear and distinct to include those one believes and for which one 
would easily have a clear and distinct perception of the proposition’s truth if one 
were to consider the proposition. The fact that I was not having a clear and 
distinct perception of the truth of 2+2=4 as I was writing this paragraph would 
not, on this suggested amendment, prevent 2+2=4 from counting as a bit of 
foundational knowledge, because I already believe 2+2=4 and it would again be 
clear and distinct to me simply upon entertaining it. According to this suggestion, 
the class of propositions that count as foundationally justified by reason is 
constrained by what one believes and by what can easily become clear and distinct 
for one. Thus, contrary to the Reidians’ concern, we need not uncritically allow 
that whatever beliefs reason produces count as justified.  But it is unclear how a 
subject can, by Cartesian standards, be justified in relying on these propositions 
that count as clear and distinct only as members of the expanded class. Surely one 
can wonder to oneself, “Couldn’t my future clear and distinct beliefs be false?” If 
the beliefs in question are ones the subject now holds and that would easily 
become clear and distinct upon future reflection, then the answer to the question 
is “No”: but that fact provides little intellectual satisfaction for the Descartes who 
wants to be sure that he will not fall into intellectual error.8 
                                                                
7 I defend this view as a consequence of an ‘armchair’ method of conceptual analysis in Gregory 
Stoutenburg, “Vicious Regresses, Conceptual Analysis, and Strong Awareness Internalism,” 
Ratio (forthcoming 2015), doi:10.1111/rati.12087.  
8 For helpful discussion on the central problem in this paper I thank the participants of Ali 
Hasan’s seminar on a priori justification held in fall 2014 at the University of Iowa. That group 
includes (but is not limited to) Ali Hasan, Bryan Appley, Landon Elkind, Dave Redmond, Nik 
Maggos, and Emily Waddle. Thanks also to Brian Collins and Nik Maggos for comments on a 
draft.  
